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The FTAA and the EU: models for Latin American integration? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
  Latin American and Caribbean integration is at a crossroad. After the successful 
development of initiatives such as the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and the 
Andean Community (ANC) in the early 1990s, these processes stalled in the middle of 
that decade. In the case of Mercosur, after the conclusion of the transition period in 1996, 
this integration scheme has failed in achieving objectives such as the customs union or 
the deepening of regional integration. This situation got worse after 1998 when the real 
crisis affected the Brazilian economy. Argentina’s default in 2001 and the brief crisis in 
Uruguay also contributed to the stagnation of Mercosur.  A similar situation took place in 
the Andean Community.  After a successful period of increased intra-regional trade from 
1990 to 1996, the process has been not able to continue in the path of success. The 
political crisis in the two key countries of the ANC (Colombia and Venezuela) and the 
position of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez towards this initiative also explain this 
situation. 
 
  Furthermore, the proposal of creating a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 
launched at the Hemispheric Summit of Miami in 1994, also collapsed in 2003. The 
differences between the FTAA model proposed by the United States and that presented 
by Brazil and Mercosur produced a bottleneck in the negotiations.  In the Ministerial 
Summit held in Miami in November 2003, countries decided to allow diverse modalities 
to promote hemispheric integration such as regional or bilateral agreements the focus of 
which could be less ambitious than the original FTAA proposal. In the Fourth Summit of 
The Americas held in Mar del Plata, Argentina, the leaders of the Americas failed to 
reach a consensus on hemisphere integration. The summit resulted in regional division 
between 29 countries, led by the United States seeking a resumption of talks toward a 
FTAA, and five countries (Venezuela and Mercosur: Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and 
Uruguay) trying to postpone the decision.  The final document reflects two antagonistic 
positions about FTAA. Twenty Five “remain committed to the achievement of a balanced 
and comprehensive FTAA Agreement that aims at expanding trade flows …” These 
countries resolved to instruct their “officials responsible for trade negotiations to resume 
their meetings, during 2006, to examine the difficulties in the FTAA process, in order to 
overcome them and advance the negotiations within the framework adopted in Miami in 
November 2003”. By contrast, countries which opposed the FTAA, argued that “the 
conditions do not exist to attain a hemispheric free trade accord that is balanced and fair 
with access to markets that are free of subsidies and distorting practices"
1. 
 
Some specialists argue that this crisis of regionalism in the Americas is a 
consequence of the integration model established in 1999, the ideological basis of which 
                                                           
 
1Final Declaration of the Summit of the Americas “Creating Jobs to Fight Poverty and Strengthen 
Democratic Governance”, Mar del Plata, November 5, 2005, http:// www.summit-
americas.org/.../IV%20Summit/Declaracion (accessed December 6, 2005)   2
was the Washington Consensus and the Programs of Structural Reforms. The collapse of 
structural reform in countries such as Argentina and Venezuela and the narrow results in 
terms of improving the standard of living could be the evidence that the neo-liberal model 
failed. Then, it is not a surprise that regional integration, based on such a model, would 
have also failed. 
 
The new left-wing governments in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 
and Venezuelan have accepted this argument and decided to promote a new model of 
regional integration. These countries have decided to retake some sort of public 
intervention in their national economic policy. Consequently, integration policy has also 
been reoriented and the neo-liberal bias has been reduced. The Brazilian proposal of a 
South American Community of Nations (SACN) is an example of this. The SACN is part 
of the Brazilian strategy of South American integration, but instead of concentrating 
exclusively on trade, it also furthers a wide development program. Brazilian government 
has tried to oppose a “South American agenda” to a “FTAA-US Agenda”. While the 
latter was centered in the new issues of the international trade (investments, intellectual 
property, governmental procurement, etc), the Brazilian one also proposes the creation of 
a regional space by investing in infrastructure, energy, telecommunications and border 
development
2. 
The government of Hugo Chavez is the most radical case in this new trend in 
Latin America. According to Chavez, Latin-American integration must be relaunched 
because its current ideological basis (neo-liberalism) is “the way to hell". In consequence, 
Chavez has promoted radical initiatives of economic and political integration such as the 
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA). ALBA aims to promote regional 
political and social integration rather than economic integration. Consequently, it would 
foster goals such as the formation of zones free of illiteracy, infant malnutrition, 
homelessness, and environmental destruction. Similarly, Chavez has fostered closer links 
with Mercosur and Venezuela has become a full member of this integration scheme in 
December 2005. Chavez has also criticized the Andean Community country decision to 
negotiate a free-trade agreement with the United States (known as AFTA)
3. According to 
the Venezuelan government the AFTA is likely to have devastating affects on the Andean 
community in the political, economic and institutional spheres.  
 
Conversely, other governments in the region have a different approach to the 
issue. Chile, Colombia, Peru and the Central American countries have maintained the 
decision to implement a market oriented economic policy. Such a decision has had an 
impact on their integration strategy, which is also based on the idea of free trade and 
liberalization. As a result, these countries have strongly supported the FTAA and when 
this proposal stalled, they accepted to negotiate bilateral free trade agreements with the 
US, based on the FTAA model.  Thus, Chile has free trade agreements in place with the 
US since 2003, while the Central American Common Market countries and the 
                                                           
 
2 Lincoln Bizzozero, “Los cambios de gobierno en Argentina y Brasil y la conformación de una 
agenda del MERCOSUR ¿Hacia una nueva cartografía sudamericana/interamericana”, Nueva Sociedad,  
no. 186, julio-agosto (2003): 132). 
 
3 Bolivia is not participating in these negotiations. Peru and the US announced in December 2005 
that they have agreed on terms for a bilateral trade agreement:   3
Dominican Republic subscribed an agreement (known as CAFTA) in 2004. Panama and 
three Andean countries are currently negotiating free trade areas. 
 
Then, two approaches concerning the integration model can be observed. The first 
one still accepts the premises of the Washington Consensus and structural reform. 
Consequently, this approach is consistent with the FTAA integration model.  The second 
one furthers a revisionist view, by proposing an increased state intervention.  To some 
extent these revisionist views, the SACN, seem to be inspired by the EU economic 
model. Chavez initiatives, such as ALBA, have been supported by Cuba.  This paper 
aims at analyzing these two models of regional integration and determines the extent to 
which they can be implemented in Latina America. 
 
The Economic View: Two models of regional integration 
 
The traditional economic debate on integration models has divided the doctrine between 
those who are defenders of a neo-liberal approach and those that support an 
interventionist model. Certainly, eclectic models have tried to combine interventionist 
and liberal policies, varying the character of the mixture according to the integration 
process.  Furthermore, a centralized planning model also exists, but this one lacks empiric 
reference after the collapse of the communist world. 
 
The liberal model 
Liberal model subscribes to the ideas of traditional theory of international trade. 
Considering integration as a "second best”, this approach conceives custom unions like a 
local experience of liberalization of borders, “justifiable whereas transitory stage in 
which tariffs and other restrictions to trade would be gradually eliminated”
4. 
Accordingly, regional integration would aim essentially at abolishing barriers and 
obstacles that prevent the free flow of goods and services between the diverse national 
economies.  Thus, an integrated economic space would be created in which the 
functioning of laws of the market would allow intensifying the economic 
interdependence between countries. In this approach, the creation of an economic 
integrated space and the consequent elimination of all forms of discrimination between 
factors and products had to be made in a gradual way. This supposed the transit of 
diverse stages, from a free trade area to a total economic union, previous achievement of 
a customs union and common market.  
 
For the liberal approach, economic integration has not been always synonymous 
of welfare. Based on the early Jacob Viner´s
5 contribution on the customs unions theory, 
liberals make a distinction between those integration initiatives in which trade creation is 
promoted and those in which trade diversion predominates. Trade creation supposes the 
displacement of high cost producers by others of low cost producers, thus increasing of 
welfare in the integrated region. Trade diversion implies the substitution of low cost 
producers by others of high cost producers, a situation in which a loss of regional welfare 
                                                           
 
4Juan Mario Vacchino, “Teorías, Esquemas y Experiencias de Integración Económica Regional”, 
Mundo Nuevo, Caracas, año 5, no. 15-16, enero-junio (1982): 154-182.). 
 
5 Viner Jacob, The Customs Issue Union (New York: Carnegie for Endowment Peace, 1950).    4
takes place. As nation states are supposedly rational actors, they would further regional 
integration schemes in which trade creation prevails.  
 
The analysis of the diverse theories of regional integration makes it difficult to 
classify the FTAA as an integration model. This is not a modality of interventionist 
integration, because no device of development planning, industrial programming or 
mechanism to mitigate the asymmetries resulting from the diverse levels of development 
have been included. This would allow arguing that the FTAA is based upon a classic 
liberal approach. Nevertheless, a more careful analysis leads to the conclusion that the 
FTAA proposal moves away in several aspects from the traditional liberal models. 
FTAA is 
an example of
 the 
new regionalism predominant in the post Cold War world economic system. This new regionalism differs 
from previous proposals developed in the 1960s and 1970s. Though many of the premises of traditional theory of economic 
integration are useful to explain and understand current wave of regionalism, the analysis of this latter only
 based on traditional 
premises of customs unions theory
 would be a mistake.  
The FTAA is based on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
model of integration. NAFTA aims to promote the goal of free trade without intending to 
extend automatically to other stages of integration, such as customs union or common 
market. This was specifically rejected by the government of the United States due to 
pressures of diverse social groups, in particular special trade unions, which have rejected 
free movement of labor. This per se is not the real innovating issue. Other integration 
schemes such as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) or the Caribbean Free 
Trade Area of (CARIFTA) also did not try to surpass free trade. The peculiarity of 
NAFTA is that the merger of a timid approach led to set up a free trade area with other 
ambitious economic objectives, such as the regulation of important sectors of the 
economies of countries’ members. This makes NAFTA a scheme that goes beyond of the 
elimination of the tariff restrictions. FTAA aims to extend this model to the rest of the 
hemisphere. 
 
The interventionist model  
 
The interventionist model conceives integration like a process that goes beyond 
commercial issues. Its objective is the promotion of economic development and, 
specially, industrialization. Harry Johnson made the first contributions to surpass the 
narrow liberal view of economic integration. According to Johnson, economic integration 
could be seen as a means to promote public goods. Johnson argues that customs unions 
are created to protect “a collective preference in favor of the industrial sector". Economic 
integration is a mechanism to encourage directed investments to promote new industrial 
developments, capturing economies of scale and promoting competition in the industrial 
sector of small and relatively undeveloped economies. In addition, integration would 
allow the achievement of other economic objectives. By fostering industrialization, it 
could help countries improve their terms of trade with the rest of the world and improve 
their bargaining power vis-à-vis others regions
6. 
 
                                                           
 
6Brada and Méndez, 187.   5
Another important interventionist approach is represented by structuralism. For 
André Marchal, the utmost objective of integration is not to fuse markets but economies, 
through the progressive union of national economic spaces in a new economic and 
political organization, characterized by solidarity between its members
7. Integration 
could not be based just on market mechanisms but also requires State intervention as 
director of the process. Furthermore, integration must be promoted among geographically 
neighboring countries with similar levels of economic development, and governments 
should further measures to facilitate production in scale, allow in diversification of 
production which in turn will promote technical progress.  
 
Structuralism does not conceive national economies like a homogenous, harmonic 
and balance space, but like complex, heterogeneous and structured one. This view is very 
different from the liberal theory based on the idea of equilibrium and its automatic re-
establishment. For that reason, states must lead a socially balanced and harmonious 
process through public policies. As Vacchino
8 asserts, such policies can use markets and 
its automatism, but, also and mainly, they must promote deliberate actions and 
institutions. Integration must make compatible market oriented policies with States led 
policies and the institutions. 
 
There have been different examples of this model in the experiences of integration 
in Western Europe and Latin America. In this latter region the influence of the model of 
integration proposed by the Economic Commission for Latin American (ECLAC) in 
1960s and 1970s was important, and centered on the promotion of industrialization at 
regional scale. Integration was conceived like a mechanism to foster programs of 
industrial development that some countries had begun to develop in previous decades and 
that were in danger to be continued in their phase of production of capital goods, due to 
the narrowness of national markets. The continuation of industrialization in the regional 
scope, would allow creating factories with a suitable size to take advantage of the 
reduction in the medium costs generated by the achievement of economies of scale, thus 
increasing efficiency and avoiding that existed installed capacity was under-utilized.   
Similarly, integration would allow financing industrial join ventures that required 
enormous investments in capital and technologies that did not exist in most of the 
countries of the region. 
 
  This strategy would require a strong participation of states in the promotion of 
new industries and tariff protection vis-à-vis third countries. In the ECLAC´s proposal, 
industrial goods produced in the first stage of economic integration, must be included in a 
free trade regime, thus creating a regional market in which the new productions would 
learn to be competitive, before being exposed to extra-regional competition
9. 
 
                                                           
 
7 André Marchal, Integración y regionalización de la economía europea (Madrid: Seminarios y 
Ediciones S.A, 1970). 
 
8 Vacchino, 166. 
 
9 Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL), Transformación productiva con equidad 
(Santiago: Naciones Unidas, 1990)   6
ECLAC’S approach to open regionalism can also be conceived like an 
interventionist model. A tendency exists to confuse open regionalism with opening of 
markets in structural adjustment programs. Nevertheless, ECLAC´s version of open 
regionalism goes beyond commercial liberalization. This modality of regional integration 
was included in the Latin American debate about the issue when the old ECLAC's ideas 
on industrialization and regional import substitution lost relevance in the political and 
academic circles of the region. The Latin American version of open regionalism was 
delineated by ECLAC in the document “Open Regionalism in Latin American in the 
Caribbean: Economic Integration as Contribution to Changing Production Pattern with 
Social Equity” (1994). In the document is asserted that integration policies in Latin 
America have been dual in the last few years. On the one hand, diverse intergovernmental 
commercial agreements leading to create free trade areas or, in some cases, customs 
unions have been promoted. Other integration initiatives include objectives such as 
regulation of investments, intellectual property, abolition of non-tariffs barriers, and co-
ordination of economic policies. ECLAC describes this dynamic as integration furthered 
by policies
10. 
 
These integration agreements are in line with a parallel process of “de facto’” 
integration fostered by macroeconomic and trade policies, the effect of which is the 
creation of similar economic conditions in the majority of Latin American countries. This 
has furthered regional interdependence what has been reflected in factors such as a share 
tendency towards the consolidation of a coherent and stable macroeconomic framework, 
unilateral tariff reduction, non-discriminatory promotion of exports, elimination and 
deregulation of obstacles to foreign investments and privatization of public firms. 
 
ECLAC defines open regionalism as a process that results from reconciling “the 
interdependence that stems from preferential agreements and the interdependence which 
basically arises from the market signals that are produced by trade liberalization in 
general. What open regionalism seeks to accomplish is to make explicit integration 
policies compatible with, and complementary with the promotion of international 
competitiveness”
11. In other words, by furthering open regionalism, Latin American 
countries would be aiming at making compatible formal integration policies with those 
policies leading to foster a better insertion of Latin American countries in the world 
economy. Thus, “open regionalism may be understood as a non-multilateral way to move 
towards an open international system of commerce”
12. 
 
Specialists such as Germánico Salgado, argues that the similarities between open 
regionalism and neo-liberalism are so considerable, that this could be perceived like a 
simple return to the Vinerian theory of customs unions, in which integration is a sub-
optimal in the way towards the total liberalization of multilateral trade. Nevertheless, this 
                                                           
 
10 Economic Commission for Latin America, Open Regionalism in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: Economic Integration as a Contribution to Changing Production Pattern which Equity 
(Santiago de Chile: ECLAC, 1994). 
 
11 ECLAC, 13. 
 
12Andrés Cisneros and Jorge Campell, “El Mercosur: regionalismo abierto o un Building Block”, 
Boletim de Integração Latino-Americana, no. 19, julho-dezembro (1990),  http: 
//www.mre.gov.bt/getec/WEBGETEC/BILA (accessed: 12 March, 1998).   7
criticism forgets the really innovating element of open regionalism: its attempt to 
incorporate the proposal of a productive transformation with equity within the integration 
policy. In Latin America an increase of productivity through a process of absorption and 
diffusion of the acquired technical progress is required. Similarly, the region needs to 
enlarge national markets and promote a synergy between firms, sectors and institutions 
and, in general terms, improve the systemic efficiency of the productive structure.
13 
 
  In ECLAC´s ideas, regional integration could collaborate in this process of 
productive transformation, incorporation and diffusion of technologies available in the 
world. The widening of markets and increasing links between firms, sectors and 
institutions at subregional scale, allow the development of joint ventures helping to 
achieve gradually comparative advantages in sectors in which technological development 
and learning are facilitated by regional action.  Similarly, regional integration would 
contribute to transform the old imports substituting industries in exporting industries to 
use regional market as previous phase before their penetration to global competition. 
Furthermore, integration can be useful in the promotion of the technological innovation. 
Similar tastes of population and geographic proximity would allow using regional 
markets like a space in which to promote technological innovations in new products at 
less cost and with lower degree of uncertainty than in extra-regional markets. Integration 
can improve the joint bargaining power of the region and help improve infrastructure and 
facilitation of trade, elements helping productive transformation
14. 
 
  European integration can also be described like interventionist, although in a 
different way from that in Latin America. The objective of the European Economic 
Community, currently European Union, was never industrialization, a goal long time ago 
achieved in the old continent. Nevertheless, the European integration has promoted some 
policies such as protection to consumers, financial support to the less favored regions of 
countries members and mainly the common agricultural policy, that have implied a 
strong State intervention. The ideas of Thomas Biersteker
 on the role of the State in 
economy allow validating the argument on the interventionist bias of the integration 
model in Europe. According to Biersteker
15, at least six modalities of state 
interventionism in the economy can be found:  
1.  The first modality tries to influence in a positive way the behavior of the 
private sector through fiscal policy or monetary policy.  
2.   The second regulates the behavior of deprived economic actors or organize 
their economic activity through policies leading to protect the environment, 
social security programs or labor legislation.  
3.   A third modality of intervention attempts to transform the State into mediator 
between capital and labor.  
                                                           
 
13Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL), Transformación productiva con equidad 
(Santiago: Naciones Unidas, 1990), 166. 
 
14 CEPAL, 166-170. 
 
15Thomas Biersteker, Reducing the Role of the State in the Economy: The Politics of Stabilization 
and Structural Adjustment,  Communication presented in the Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Washington, D.C., August, 1988. 
   8
4.  The fourth modality is the redistribution of social product by means of 
subventions or industrial policy.  
5.  The fifth is the direct production of goods and services.  
6.  The last modality of intervention of the State is in economic planning.  
 
  Accepting Biersteker’s ideas, one can observe several types of interventionist 
policies in the European integration. The communitarian legislation to protect 
environment and the consumer protection policy are clearly modalities of regulating 
interventionism. The common agricultural policy and the regional policy are forms of 
redistributing interventionism. The project of construction of Airbus is an example of 
interventionism whose objective is the production of a particular good. Consequently, it 
is valid to describe to the experience of integration in Western Europe like 
interventionist.  
 
Beyond economics: FTAA and UE as integration types 
 
Based on a categorization made by Di Filippo and Franco
16, one can argue that two 
different conceptions about regional integration exist in the Americas.  For these 
specialists, some agreements aim at liberalizing the flow of trade and investments in the 
continent. These are the “Type A” agreements. By contrast, another sort of agreement is 
designed to promote policies beyond the liberalization of markets. Such agreements are 
known as “Type B”.  This classification can be useful to understand current integration 
schemes in the Americas. However, both Types A and B must be studied not only in 
terms of the economic model they pursue, otherwise, it would make no sense as a 
theoretical tool, because it would not be different from that presented in the previous 
section (models of integration).  To understand this issue, the political and social level of 
these agreements must also be analyzed (see table 1).  
Table 1 
Types of Integration 
Level  Type A  Type B 
Political Intergovernmental  Intergovernmental  + 
Supranational 
Economic Liberal  Interventionist 
Social   No Social Dimension  Social Committed 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
In economic terms, the Type A is the empirical reference to the liberal model. The 
economic aspects are centred on the liberalisation of trade and factors of production as 
proposed by the liberal model.  However, this type of agreement does not cover aspects 
such as coordination of macroeconomic policies, common currency, tax policy or 
regional policy. Notwithstanding this, type A includes the so-called trade-related issues, 
such as intellectual property or public procurement. 
                                                           
 
16 Armando Di Filippo and Rolando Franco “¿Qué modelo de integración regional puede 
contribuir a un desarrollo con equidad?”, Socialis, Revista Latinoamericana de Política Social, Buenos 
Aires, no. 3, noviembre (2000): 45-62. 
   9
At the political level, these agreements are classic examples of 
intergovernmentalism. There is not a pooling of sovereignty and, consequently, security 
and defence issues remain at the sphere of nation-states. This intergovernmentalist 
approach led to a weak institutional framework, in which supranationality has been 
totally excluded. For this reason, the creation of a regional identity is a difficult goal to 
achieve. 
Finally, the social dimension in this sort of agreement is just limited to the signing 
of labour treaties, the main objective of which is to make compulsory the execution of 
domestic law on the issue.  These compromises aim at making compatible social co-
operation with liberalisation of markets.  This would imply a convergence towards a 
minimum social platform on social and political rights, but without any sort of 
compulsory legislation. 
The Type B is the empirical reference of the interventionist economic model. The 
Type B agreements propose not only the liberalisation of trade, although free trade is 
important objective to be achieved. Instead these agreements foster the establishment of 
mechanisms leading to integrate labour and capital markets. The objective of these 
measures is to move toward a common market in which free movement of labour and 
capital would exist. Moreover, this type of agreement entails the co-ordination and 
harmonisation of policies such as fiscal revenues or taxes. The utmost objective is the 
unification of some of these policies. By the same token, these sort of agreements further 
a regional policy leading to aid to less developed regions thus promoting economic and 
social cohesion. 
At the political level, a Type B agreement accepts mechanisms to pool 
sovereignty and, consequently, the security and defence issues could be included in a 
common framework, at least as long-term objective. This approach led to a relatively 
strong institutional framework, in which supranationality could be accepted.  This could 
contribute to creation of a regional identity. 
At the social level, co-ordination, harmonisation and unification of social policies 
become a possibility in these agreements. As a result, aspects such as employment 
policies and rights, work organization, health, hygiene and safety at work, social 
protection, equality between women and men, social protection, etc., are covered by the 
integration process. 
Comparing the FTAA and the EU as models and Type of Regional Integration 
The FTAA is a Type A agreement.  In political terms, the FTAA excludes any 
mechanism of pooling sovereignty. The overwhelming US hegemony vis-à-vis Canada 
and Mexico and the fact this country is also a global hegemon does not allow the creation 
of any mechanism to promote a common security or defence policy. 
In the economic dimension, the FTAA is mostly centred on the liberalisation of 
trade and investments by eliminating progressively barriers to trade in goods, services 
and capitals. However, the FTAA also covers sectors related to trade (public 
procurement, intellectual rights, environment, labour, etc) (see table 2). All these issues 
have been the cornerstone of discussions since the beginning of the pre-negotiation 
period in Denver, Colorado (1995). The discussions of diverse hypothesis of negotiation 
started in Florianopolis, Brazil in September 1996. Trade and investment issues were  10
maintained as the most important topics of these debates. Negotiations were launched in 
the Summit of Santiago in 1998.  Previous tendencies that privileged trade and 
investments were ratified in this summit by creating eight negotiations groups, none of 
them devoted to social issues.  In the third summit of the Americas held in Quebec City, a 
Draft of the FTAA treaty was presented.   
Table 2 
FTAA an the EU 
Political - Institutional Aspects 
Category FTAA  EU 
Relation sovereignty - 
Integration 
Competitive Sovereignty  Pooling Sovereignty 
Defence  Not covered  Members seek to develop 
a common defence policy
Security Policy  Not covered  Members seeks to 
develop a common 
foreign policy 
Institutionality Weak  High 
Supranational Identity  High   Weak 
Socio-Political Support  High  (with some 
reserves: UK) 
Weak 
Source: Own elaboration but based on ideas of Lazin, 1995 and Curzio 2004. 
 
In the Summit of Miami (1994), a Plan on Sustainable Development and 
Democracy was approved. However, this social agenda was put in the negotiations. No 
social proposal was included in the body of the drafts of the agreement and most of their 
norms were related to trade and investments (see table 4).  
The EU is an example of a Type B agreement.  As an EU Document asserts, this 
integration scheme is not a simple organization for co-operation between governments, 
like the United Nations. Conversely, the countries that make up the EU (its ‘member 
states’) remain independent sovereign nations but they pool their sovereignty in order to 
gain a strength and world influence none of them could have on their own. “Pooling 
sovereignty means, in practice, that the member states delegate some of their decision-
making powers to shared institutions they have created, so that decisions on specific 
matters of joint interest can be made democratically at European level”
17. As a 
consequence, the EU has succeeded in creating a solid institutional framework in which 
supranational and intergovernmental elements have been merged. Likewise, the EU has 
tried to define its own political personality by moving forward the creation of a common 
foreign and security policy (see table 2).  
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European Union, Introducing the European Union, 
http://europa.eu.int/institutions/index_en.htm (accessed:  November 31, 2005)  11
In the economic sphere, the EU is not just a free trade area but an economic union 
in which is allowed the free flow of services, persons and capital. For example, free flow 
of workers in the European Economic Community has been granted since 1968.   
Common policies, such as agricultural policy and regional policy, were established in the 
1960s and 1970s. In the 199Os, a cohesion policy was implemented. And more recently 
was set up an economic and monetary union and since 2002 a common currency: Euro
18 
(see table 3). 
 
Table 3 
FTAA an the EU 
Economic Aspects 
Category FTAA  EU 
Goals  A single market for 
trade of goods 
Economic Union 
Integration Model  Liberal   Interventionism (maket 
+ state) 
Integration Method  Lack of Horizons (Just a 
FTA). 
Functionalist (gradual 
inclusion of new areas) 
Currency  National currencies  Common currency 
Customs  Each country retains its 
own customs regulations 
Single Market (abolition 
of borders control) 
Transportation  Trucks and common 
carries can move 
between countries 
Common Policy 
Inflation and Economic 
Management  
Not included  Member states must 
adhere to maximum 
limits 
Competition and Quality  Not covered  Common strategies to 
make all countries 
equally competitive.  
Minimum quality 
regulations. 
Consumer Protection  Not covered  Common standards 
                                                           
 
18 The Euro is the official currency in Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland and Greece.  12
regulations. 
Tax Legislation  Double Taxation 
Treaties 
Standards guidelines for 
member states.  
Investment  OMC Plus  Free movements of 
capitals and investments 
Intellectual Property  OMC Plus  Common Policy 
Public Procurement  OMC Plus  Common Policy 
Regional Policy and 
Cohesion 
Not covered  Common regional policy 
Source: Own elaboration,  based on ideas of Lazin, 1995 and Curzio 2004. 
 
At the social level, according the article 2 of the treaty of Maastricht, the EU must 
“promote economic and social progress and a high level of employment and to achieve 
balanced and sustainable development, in particular through the creation of an area 
without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion and 
through the establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single 
currency in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty” (see table 4). To achieve these 
goals, the EU has promoted various strategies
19 (see EU 2005b), such as:  
1.  The creation of a European Social fund. 
2.  A European employment strategy. 
3.  The coordination of social security systems.  
4.  A  framework strategy on equal opportunities for men and women (2001-
2005). 
5.  Common educational programs such as ERASMUS. 
6.  The signing of a European Social Charter. 
 
Table 4 
FTAA an the EU 
Social Aspects 
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European Union, Activities of the European Union. Employment and Social Affairs, 
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Category FTAA  EU 
Social Security Policy  Not covered  Standard criteria apply 
to all countries 
Employment  Workers are not 
included 
Free movement of 
labour 
Migration and 
Citizenship 
Only professional, 
business persons and 
investors have the to 
transfer to work in 
member states 
Free movement of 
citizens and right of 
residence 
Environment Common  standards 
established in side 
agreement  
Common Policy  
Health   Not covered  Common Program 
Education  Not covered  Exchange Programs 
Gender  Not covered  Policies to promote 
equality 
Source: Own elaboration but based on ideas of Lazin, 1995 and Curzio 2004. 
What model for Latin American Integration: the contribution of the EU 
The collapse of the strategy of industrialisation, the debt crisis in the 1980s and the most 
severe economic recession of the region for decades, supposedly demonstrated that 
interventionist model was misleading. In consequence, this latter was actually excluded 
from most of the national economic strategies of Latin American and Caribbean countries 
and it was substituted by neo-liberal ideas inspired in the structural adjustment 
programmes recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank.  
 
As a result, integration strategies in Latin America and the Caribbean have been 
modified and adapted to this new predominant liberal approach. This is essentially 
centred on the promotion of free trade, excluding any sort of policy leading to promote 
regional industrial development, as the old Latin American and Caribbean integration 
proposals in the 1960s and 1970s suggested. For neo-liberalism integration must always 
be subordinated to multilateral liberalisation of trade and must be oriented to foster trade 
creation and not trade diversion. This would validate the classical theory that considers 
that trade creation has positive effects on welfare, whilst trade diversion reduce welfare. 
Those arguments that emphasised the need for trade diversion in customs unions and 
those that promoted regional localisation of industries between developing countries were 
discarded. Integration schemes in Latin America became part of a global strategy to 
promote the liberalisation, without exception or reserves, of goods and services, the 
elimination of restrictions to foreign investments, the rejection of policies leading to  14
promote industrialisation and the exclusion of preferential and compensatory measures to 
assist less developed countries or regions.  
Therefore, the liberal model was quite popular in the 1990s in the region. 
Nonetheless, this enthusiasm with this model was severely affected by the “Real” Crisis 
in Brazil (1998) and particularly by the Argentina’s Default in 2001. Similarly, although 
structural reform helps achieving a better macroeconomic environment in some countries 
of the region, its contribution to the solution of problems such as the regional 
competitiveness, the financial instability or inequity was fairly poor.  Finally, since the 
end of last decade and, at least partially, as a result of the social effects of structural 
reform, new leaders have come to power in various countries with a political discourse 
and an economic strategy opposed, or at least critical, to the liberal model.  This is case of 
Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Luiz Ignácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, Néstor Kirchner in 
Argentina, Tabaré Vasquez in Uruguay, and more recently, Evo Morales in Bolivia.  
Despite the differences among them, a common denominator exists: free trade is not 
enough. Consequently, the liberal model that was the ideological base of the new Latin 
American integration is currently in crisis in many countries of the region. Obviously, 
such a situation has had an impact on the political support to a FTAA type of regional 
integration model. 
The crux of this matter is not if the market is good or bad. In reality, the markets 
are social constructions. Therefore, they cannot be properly analyzed without considering 
structural factors and institutional variables that differ among societies. Specialists such 
as Joseph Stiglizt
20 has pointed out that one of the problems of the Washington 
Consensus was its attempt to promote a single agenda, untailored to the circumstances of 
each country. This agenda privileged trade liberalization, deregulation and privatization, 
disregarding factors such as the competition policy, fiscal regulation, promotion of 
technology, education, the strengthening of institutions and the problem of inequity in the 
region
21. There one can find the reasons of the failure. As the FTAA subscribes to this 
model, could it help promote a regional integration that could further productive 
transformation with equity?  
One must start by asserting that tariff reductions and the promotion of an 
exporting strategy based on the regional comparative advantages do not guaranteed a 
suitable insertion of the region in the world economy. An efficient international insertion 
depends not only on the comparative advantages but also, and in an increasingly 
important degree, on the competitive advantages based on “non-prices factors”. These 
cannot be created just by the correction of the relative prices through a policy of tariff 
reductions. Conversely, the new competition requires a state policy that brings about 
technical progress; improve the quality of human resources and help increase the income 
and welfare of population (Fürst 1993: 51).  
                                                           
 
20 Joseph Stiglitz, “Más instrumentos y metas más amplias para el desarrollo. Hacia el Post 
Consenso de Washington”, Desarrollo Económico vol. 38, no. 151, octubre-noviembre (1998): 691-721. 
 
21 This topic is widely discussed in Henry J. Bruton, “A Reconsideration of Import Substitution”, 
Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XXXVI, no. 2, June (1998): 903-936; Joseph Stiglitz, Whither 
Reform?, Towards a New Agenda For Latin America, Prebisch Lecture delivered at the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, in Santiago, Chile, on 26 August 2002. 
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  Secondly, regional integration must be part of a global strategy leading to 
promote “high technology exports”, in which new knowledge had been incorporated. It is 
crucial to understand that there must be a symbiosis between exports and learning process 
at the domestic level. In general, those who support the exporting strategy subscribe to 
the belief that when developing countries productions are exposed to foreign competition, 
a jump in their technological development occurs making them internationally 
competitive. Nevertheless, there is strong evidence against this assumption. The 
experience indicates that instead of increasing the state of technological development, 
what happens is that those firms or companies exposed to international competition must 
experience a difficult process of adaptation. In this process, factors such as firm 
organization, social institutions, values, incentives, commitment with the growth and 
other series of factors that define a society play a fundamental role
22. 
 
  The EU’s experience can be useful in these issues. In the EU European Council 
held in Lisbon, in March 2000, European leaders placed enhanced competition and 
innovation as clear aims on their agenda, two aspects that are believed to be key to 
promote competitiveness and economic growth
23.  Although, the EU is a an integration 
scheme based on the “principle of an open market economy with free competition”, the 
member states have decided to promote a competition policy regarded as instrumental to 
make the EU “the world’s most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy” by 
2010
24. Particular importance has been given to the role of research, development and 
innovation in the promotion of a competitive economy.  In article 163 of Treaty of Union 
has been established that EU must strengthen the scientific and technological bases of 
Community industry and encourage it to become more competitive at international level.  
According to a EU´s document “Scientific and technological development is the driving 
force of economic and social growth, particularly when it comes to creating job”
25. Then, 
the EU recognizes that in a world of increasing economic competition is crucial to 
promote research and innovation to maintain a role of leader in the international markets.   
 
  By the same token, the EU has succeeded in creating an institutional framework 
(a mixture of supranationality and intergovernmentalism) and a routine of cooperation 
that stabilize peace in Western Europe. Similarly, because of a long experience of 
integration, Western Europe has consolidated values such as the defense of democracy, 
the defense of Human Rights and so called European Social Model. One of the key 
elements of this “social model” is the idea of solidarity, which has been also part of the 
EU experience. Thus, the regional policy has been a manifestation on the extent to which 
                                                           
 
22 Bruton, 930.   
 
23 Neelie Kroes, “Intellectual Property, competition and the Lisbon Agenda”, IPR-Helpdesk 
Bulletin, no 24, November-December (2005), http://www.ipr-
helpdesk.org/newsletter/24/html/EN/editorial.html (accessed January  6, 2006). 
 
 
24 Commission of the European Communities, A-pro-active Competition Policy for a Competitive 
Europe (Brussels, 20.4.2004. COM (2004) 293 final), 3 (accessed December 28, 2005). 
 
25
European Union, Towards a European Research Area, 
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/i23010.htm (accessed December 28, 2005). 
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richer countries may help in the progress of less developed countries through 
communitarian institutions.  
  By contrast, The FTAA does not deal with these crucial issues. NAFTA, after 
which the FTTA is modeled, neither considered it. In a recent report published by the 
World Bank (Lessons from NAFTA for Latin America and the Caribbean Countries: A 
Summary of Research Findings), Daniel Lederman, William F. Maloney and Luis Servén 
have found that after ten years NAFTA has spurred economic development in Mexico, 
but free trade has been not enough to achieve economic convergence with its two 
commercial partners. The study asserts that this convergence will be difficult to 
accomplish even in the long run without investment in innovation, infrastructure and 
adequate institutions
26. 
 
Similarly, if regional integration wants to become a tool to further Latin-American 
development, it must include a social agenda. In the Summit of Miami (1994), the social 
problem was considered by Presidents who recommended the need to pay attention to 
issues such as education, health, work conditions, etc (Delgado Rojas, 2000). These 
topics were also discussed in the Summit of Santiago, in which an ambitious Plan of 
Cooperation was approved, including socioeconomic, political and cultural issues. 
Nevertheless, these plans did not imply compulsory commitments to the countries
27. The 
reality is that trade issues have prevailed, at least until the Ministerial Summit of Quito, 
and the social aspects have been secondary. This largely explains the rejection that the 
FTAA has found in important sectors of the Latin American and Caribbean societies and 
in some governments. On this point, the EU experience is also important. The EU has 
produced a convergence around an integration model with a social dimension. As Mario 
Telo
28 points out, the European social model highlights “the fact that, despite the 
homogenizing tendencies of globalization, Western Europe has developed a dynamic 
equilibrium between international competitiveness, social cohesion, and democratic 
society that involves an active role for organized social, actors and relatively generous 
Welfare State systems and public services, even if these differ from state to state”. 
 
Finally, the new role of the State in the integration process must be reconsidered. 
It is true than in previous decades the Latin American governments were little efficient in 
managing economic issues, but this cannot lead to the conclusion that the State is to per  
inefficient. As Bruton
29 points out, “the role that governments can play depends (...) on 
institutions, history and culture of the community. Some governments are lethal, many 
are inept and neglected, but there are many things that only can be made by a 
government.” The role of government in the process of technical learning is crucial and 
must be strengthened and not weakened by policies that aim to reduce the State.  
                                                           
 
26Daniel, Lederman, William F. Maloney and Luis Servén, Lessons from NAFTA for Latin 
America and the Caribbean Countries: A Summary of Research Findings (Washington: The World Bank, 
2005). 
 
 
27 Di Filippo and Franco, 53 
 
28 Mario Telò, Europe: A Civilian Power? European Union, Global Governance, World Order 
(London: Palgrave, 2005), 52. 
 
29 Bruton, 931.  17
 
Conclusion 
Arguably, the Type B is a modality of regional integration that could be a more efficient 
tool to help Latin American integration overcome its current difficulties. Without 
rejecting the liberalisation of markets, Type B agreements also promote policies, the 
objective of which is the reduction of internal and international asymmetries. A region 
Latin American like and the Caribbean  in which there is a shocking inequality, needs an 
integration model, that without excluding the trade aspect, propose the creation of a 
solidarity space, as it  was conceived by the structuralist thought on regional integration. 
This implies the promotion of measures to address the extreme vulnerabilities and 
existing asymmetries in the region, which implies, retaking once again the structuralists 
ideas that the richest partner in the process contributes with the less rich partners, so that 
all are beneficiaries.  Similarly, free trade must be complemented by measures fostering 
knowledge, institutions and values, key elements to guarantee a successful insertion in 
the world market. All this shows us that free trade is not enough to promote regional 
integration, as the EU experience also demonstrates. 
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